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Abstract—The drastic increase of JavaScript exploitation
attacks has led to a strong interest in developing techniques to
enable malicious JavaScript analysis. Existing analysis tech-
niques fall into two general categories: static analysis and
dynamic analysis. Static analysis tends to produce inaccurate
results (both false positive and false negative) and is vulnerable
to a wide series of obfuscation techniques. Thus, dynamic
analysis is constantly gaining popularity for exposing the
typical features of malicious JavaScript. However, existing
dynamic analysis techniques possess limitations such as limited
code coverage and incomplete environment setup, leaving a
broad attack surface for evading the detection. To overcome
these limitations, we present the design and implementation of
a novel JavaScript forced execution engine named JSForce
which drives an arbitrary JavaScript snippet to execute along
different paths without any input or environment setup. We
evaluate JSForce using 220,587 HTML and 23,509 PDF real-
world samples. Experimental results show that by adopting our
forced execution engine, the malicious JavaScript detection rate
can be substantially boosted by 206.29% using same detection
policy without any noticeable false positive increase. We also
make JSForce publicly available as an online service and
will release the source code to the security community upon
the acceptance for publication.
I. INTRODUCTION
Malicious JavaScript has become an important attack vec-
tor for software exploitation attacks. Attacks in browsers, as
well as PDF files containing malicious embedded JavaScript,
are typical examples of how attackers launch attacks us-
ing JavaScript. According to a recent report from Syman-
tec [8], there are millions of victims attacked by malicious
JavaScript on the Internet each day.
In recent years, a number of techniques [17], [29], [22],
[21], [26], [35], [18], [25], [16] have been proposed to detect
malicious JavaScript code. Due to the dynamic features of
the JavaScript language, static analysis [20], [27], [38], [18]
can be easily evaded using obfuscation techniques [46].
Consequently, researchers rely upon dynamic analysis [17],
[29], [22] to expose the typical features of malicious
JavaScript. More specifically, these approaches rely upon
visiting websites or opening PDF files with a full-fledged
or emulated browser/PDF reader and then monitoring the
different features (eval strings [22], heap health [35], etc.)
for detection.
However, the typical JavaScript malware is designed
to execute within a particular environment, since they
aim to exploit specific vulnerabilities, as opposed to be-
nign JavaScript, which will run in a more environment-
independent fashion. Fingerprinting techniques [42] are
widely adopted by JavaScript malware to examine the run-
time environment. A dynamic analysis system may fail to
observe some malicious behaviors if the runtime environ-
ment is not configured as expected. Such configuration is
quite challenging because of the numerous possible runtime
environment settings. Hence, existing dynamic analysis sys-
tems usually share the limitations of limited code coverage
and incomplete runtime environment setup, which leave
attackers with a broad attack surface to evade the analysis.
To solve those limitations, Rozzle [26] explores multiple
environment related paths within a single execution. But it
requires a predefined environment-related profile for path ex-
ploration. Construction of a complete profile is a challenging
task because of the numerous different browsers and plugins,
especially for recent fingerprinting techniques [31], [32].
These fingerprinting techniques do not rely upon any specific
APIs, and thus Rozzle can be evaded because the predefined
profile cannot include those fingerprinting techniques. Also,
Rozzle may introduce runtime errors because it executes
infeasible paths which may stop the analysis before the
malicious code is executed. Revolver [25] employs a ma-
chine learning-based detection algorithm to identify evasive
JavaScript malware. However, it is dependent upon a known
sample set and is unable to detect 0-day JavaScript malware.
Although symbolic execution of JavaScript [37] can be
applied to explore all of the possible execution paths, the
performance overhead of a symbolic string solver [41] and
the dynamic features of JavaScript make it infeasible for
practical use.
In this paper, we propose JSForce, a forced execution
engine for JavaScript, which drives an arbitrary JavaScript
snippet to execute along different paths without any in-
put or environment setup. While increasing code cover-
age, JSForce can tolerate invalid object accesses while
introducing no runtime errors during execution. This over-
comes the limitations of current JavaScript dynamic analysis
techniques. Note that, as an amplifier technique, JSForce
does not rely on any predefined profile information or full-
fledged hosting programs like browsers or PDF viewers, and
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it can examine partial JavaScript snippets collected during
an attack. As demonstrated in Section V, JSForce can be
leveraged to improve the detection rate of other dynamic
analysis systems without modification of their detection
policies. While the high-level concept of forced execution
has been introduced in binary code analysis (X-Force [33],
iRiS [19]), we face unique challenges in realizing this
concept in JavaScript analysis, given that JavaScript and
native code are very different languages by nature.
We implement JSForce on top of the V8 JavaScript
engine [11] and evaluate the correctness, effectiveness, and
runtime performance of JSForce with 220,587 HTML
files and 23,509 PDF samples. Our experimental results
demonstrate that adopting JSForce can greatly improve
the JavaScript analysis results by 206.29% without any
noticeable increase in false positives and with reasonable
performance overhead.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
1) We propose forced execution of JavaScript, a technique
that forces a JavaScript snippet to execute along differ-
ent paths while requiring no inputs or any environment
setup, to overcome the current limitations of existing
JavaScript dynamic analysis techniques: limited code
coverage and incomplete runtime environment setup.
2) To enable forced execution of JavaScript, we develop
a type inference model to detect and properly re-
cover from exceptions. We have also developed path
exploration algorithms for malicious JavaScript code
analysis.
3) We implement the technique with a prototype sys-
tem, named JSForce, and evaluate its correctness,
effectiveness, and runtime performance using 220,587
HTML and 23,509 PDF real-world samples. Experi-
mental results show that by adopting JSForce, the
malicious JavaScript detection rate is substantially in-
creased by 206.29% while still using the same detection
policy. This increase comes without any noticeable in-
crease in false positives and with runtime performance
that is very suitable for large-scale analysis.
4) We create an online service and make JSForce pub-
licly available at [9]. Upon the acceptance for publi-
cation, we will release the source code of JSForce to
the security community.
II. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW
To provide the reader with a better understanding of the
motivation for our system and the problems that it addresses,
we begin with a discussion of the malicious JavaScript code
used in drive-by-download attacks.
Malicious JavaScript code: Malicious JavaScript code
is typically obfuscated and will attempt to fingerprint the
version of the victim’s software (browser, PDF reader, etc.),
identify vulnerabilities within that software or the plugins
that that software uses, and then launch one or more exploits.
1 i f ( ( n a v i g a t o r . appName . indexOf ( ” M i c r o s o f t
I n t e ” + ” r n e t E x p l o r e r ” ) == 1 ) && (
n a v i g a t o r . u s e r A g e n t . indexOf ( ”Windows N” +
”T 5 . 1 ” ) == 1 ) && ( n a v i g a t o r . u s e r A g e n t .
indexOf ( ”MSI” + ”E 8 . 0 ” ) == 1 ) ) {
2 a t t = b t t + 1 ;
3 }
4 i f ( a t t == 0) {
5 t r y {
6 new Ac t iveXObjec t ( ”UM0QS4dD” ) ;
7 } c a t c h ( e ) {
8 v a r t lMoOul8 = ’\x25 ’ + ’ u9 ’ + ’\x30 ’
+ ’\x39 ’ + YYGRl6 ;
9 t lMoOul8 += tlMoOul8 ;
10 v a r CBmH8 = ”%u ” ;
11 v a r vBYG0 = u n e s c a p e ;
12 v a r EuhV2 = ”BODY” ;
13 . . .
14 }
15 }
16 s e t T i m e o u t ( ” r e d i r ( ) ” , 3000) ;
Figure 1: The Malicious JavaScript Sample
Figure 1 shows a listing of JavaScript code used for a drive-
by-download attack against the Internet Explorer browser.
Line 1 employs precise fingerprinting to deliver only se-
lected exploits that are most likely to successfully attack the
browser. Lines 5-7 contain evasive code to bypass emulation-
based detection systems. More precisely, the code attempts
to load a non-existant ActiveX control, named UM0QS4dD
(line 6). When executed within a regular browser, this
operation fails, triggering the execution of the catch block
that contains the exploitation code (lines 7-14).
However, an emulation-based detection system must emu-
late the ActiveX API by simulating the loading and presence
of any ActiveX control. In these systems, the loading of the
ActiveX control will not raise this exception. As a result,
the execution of the exploit never occurs and no malicious
activity is observed. Instead, the victim is redirected to a
benign page (line 16) if the fingerprinting or evasion stage
fails. Attackers can also abuse the function setTimeout
to create a time bomb [15] to evade detection. Detection
systems can not afford to wait for long periods of time
during the analysis of each sample in an attempt to capture
randomly triggered exploits.
Challenges and Existing Techniques: Static analysis
is a powerful technique that explores all paths of execu-
tion. But, one particular issue that plagues static analysis
of malicious JavaScript is that not all of the code can
be statically observed. For example, static analysis cannot
observe malicious code hidden within eval strings, which
are frequently exploited by attackers to obfuscate their code.
Therefore, current detection approaches [17], [29], [22]
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rely upon dynamic analysis to expose features typically
seen within malicious JavaScript. More specifically, these
approaches rely upon visiting websites or opening PDF
files with an instrumented browser or PDF reader, and
then monitoring different features (eval strings [22], heap
health [35], etc.) for detection.
However, dynamic analysis techniques suffer from two
fundamental limitations. The first limitation is limited code
coverage. This becomes a much more severe limitation
within the context of analyzing malicious JavaScript. At-
tackers frequently employ a technique called cloaking [43],
which works by fingerprinting the victim’s web browser
and only revealing the malicious content when the victim
is using a specific version of the browser with a vulnerable
plugin. Cloaking makes dynamic analysis much harder be-
cause the sample must be run within every combination of
web browser and plugin to ensure complete code coverage.
The widely-used event callback feature of JavaScript also
makes it challenging for dynamic analysis to automatically
trigger code. For example, attackers can load the attack
code only when a specific mouse click event is captured,
and automatically determining and generating such a trigger
event is difficult.
The second limitation is the complexity of the JavaScript
runtime environment. JavaScript is used within many ap-
plications, and it can call the functionality of any plugin
extensions supported by these applications. For dynamic
analysis, any pre-defined browser setup handles a known
set of browsers and plugins. Thus, there is no guarantee
that this setup will detect vulnerabilities only present in less
popular plugins. While it is possible to deploy a cluster of
machines running many different operating systems, browser
applications, and browser plugins, the exponential growth of
possible combinations rapidly causes scalability issues and
makes this approach infeasible.
Rozzle [26] attempts to address this code coverage prob-
lem by exploring environment-related paths within a single
execution. For instance, because att in Figure 1 depends
upon the environment-related API’s output, Rozzle will
execute lines 5-15 and reveal the malicious behaviors hidden
in lines 8-14 by executing both the try and catch blocks.
But, it requires a predefined environment-related profile for
path exploration. Construction of a complete profile is a
challenging task because of the numerous different browsers
and plugins, especially for newer proposed fingerprinting
techniques [31], [32], [42]. These new techniques do not
rely upon any specific APIs. For instance, the JavaScript
engine fingerprinting technique [32] relies upon JavaScript
conformance tests such as the Sputnik [10] test suite to
determine a specific browser and major version number.
There are no specific APIs used for the fingerprinting. Thus,
Rozzle cannot include it within the predefined profile and
explore the environment-related paths. Rozzle also intro-
duces runtime errors into the analysis engine, which may
stop the analysis before any malicious code is executed. In
contrast, JSForce does not rely upon predefined profile for
path exploration and handles runtime errors using the forced
execution model presented in Section III-A. By overcoming
those limitations of Rozzle, JSForce achieves greater code
coverage.
Revolver [25] employs a machine learning-based de-
tection algorithm to identify evasive JavaScript malware.
However, it requires that the malicious sample is present
within a known sample set so that its evasive version can
be determined based upon the classification difference. By
design, it can not be used for 0-day malware detection.
Symbolic execution has also been applied to the task of
exposing malware [15]. This technique, while improving
code coverage over dynamic analysis, suffers from scala-
bility challenges and is, in many ways, unnecessarily pre-
cise [26]. Within the context of JavaScript analysis, symbolic
execution becomes more challenging [37]. JavaScript appli-
cations accept many different kinds of input, and those inputs
are structured as strings. For example, a typical application
might take user input from form fields, messages from a
server via XMLHttpRequest, and data from code running
concurrently within other browser windows. It is extremely
difficult for a symbolic string solver [41] to effectively
supply values for all of these different kinds of inputs and
reason about how those inputs are parsed and validated. The
rapidly evolving JavaScript language and its host programs
(browsers, PDF readers, etc.) make the modeling of the
JavaScript API tedious work. Furthermore, the dynamic
features (such as the eval function) of JavaScript make
symbolic execution infeasible for many analysis efforts.
Overview: JSForce, our proposed forced-execution
engine for JavaScript, is an enhancement technology de-
signed to better expose the behaviors of malicious JavaScript
at runtime. Different detection policies can be applied to
examine malicious JavaScript. While the forced execution
concept is first introduced for binary code analysis (X-
Force [33]), we face unique challenges, such as type in-
ference and invalid object access recovery, in enabling the
forced execution concept for JavaScript.
We now illustrate how the forced execution of JavaScript
code works. Consider the snippet shown in Figure 1.
JSForce forces the execution through the different code
paths of the snippet. So, the exploitation code within the
catch block (lines 7-14) will be executed, no matter how
the ActiveX API is simulated by the emulation-based anal-
ysis system. Moreover, JSForce will immediately invoke
the callback function passed to setTimeout to trigger the
time bomb malware.
JSForce’s path exploration forces line 2 to be exe-
cuted, regardless of the result of the fingerprinting state-
ment (line 1). Since btt is not defined within the code
snippet under analysis, which is a common scenario be-
cause collected JavaScript code may be incomplete due to
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multi-stages of the attack, the execution of line 2 raises
a ReferenceError exception when running within a
normal JavaScript engine. When the exception is captured,
JSForce creates a FakedObject named btt, which is
fed to the JavaScript engine to recover from the invalid
object access. However, the type of btt is unknown at the
time of FakedObject’s creation. JSForce infers the type
based upon how the FakedObject is used. For example, if
this FakedObject is added to an integer, JSForce will
then change its type from FakedObject to Integer. We
call this faked object retyping.
III. JAVASCRIPT FORCED EXECUTION
This section explains the basics of how a single forced
execution proceeds. The goal is to have a non-crashable
execution. We first present the JavaScript language semantics
and then focus on how to detect and recover from invalid
object accesses. We then discuss how path exploration
occurs during forced execution.
A. Forced Execution Semantics
⟨EXPRESSIONS⟩ ::= c CONSTANT
| x VARIABLE
| x.f FIELD ACCESS
| x.prot PROTO ACCESS
| e op e BINARY OP
| this THIS
| {f1 ∶ e1, ..., fn ∶ en} OBJECT LITERAL
| {function(p1, ..., pn){S}} FUNCTION DEF
| f(a1, ..., an) FUNCTION CALL
| new f(a1, ..., an) NEW⟨STATEMENTS⟩ ::= skip SKIP
| S1 ∶ S2 SEQ
| varx VAR DECL
| x ∶= e ASSIGN
| x.f ∶= e ASSIGN
| if e then S1 else S2 CONDITIONAL
| while e do S WHILE
| try{S}catch{S}finally{S} TRY CATCH
| return e RETURN
Figure 2: Core JavaScript
The JavaScript Language: JavaScript is a high-level,
dynamic, untyped, and interpreted programming language.
Figure 2 summarizes the syntax of the core JavaScript,
which captures the essence of JavaScript. At runtime, the
JavaScript engine dynamically interprets JavaScript code
to 1) load/allocate objects, 2) determine the types of ob-
jects, and 3) execute the corresponding semantics. Given
an arbitrary JavaScript snippet, execution may fail because
of undefined/uninitialized objects or incorrect object types.
For instance, the execution of line 2 in Figure 1 raises a
ReferenceError exception because btt is not defined.
To tolerate such invalid object accesses, forced execution
must handle such failures.
Types:
τ ∶∶= ∑i∈T,T⊆{,u,b,s,n,o} ϕi
Rows:
% ∶∶= str:τ, %∣ %τ
Type environments:
Γ ∶∶= Γ(x ∶ τ)∣ ∅
Type summands
and indices:
ϕ ∶∶= Undef
ϕu ∶∶= Null
ϕb ∶∶= Bool(ξb)
ξb ∶∶= false ∣ true ∣ ⊺
ϕs ∶∶= String(ξs)
ξs ∶∶= str ∣ ⊺
ϕn ∶∶= Number(ξn)
ξn ∶∶= num ∣ ⊺
ϕf ∶∶= Function(this ∶ τ ;%→ τ)
ϕo ∶∶= Obj(∑i∈T,T⊆{b,s,n,f,} ϕi)(%)
ϕfo ∶∶= FObj
ϕff ∶∶= FFun
Figure 3: Syntax of JavaScript Types
The basic idea behind forced execution is that, whenever
a reference error is discovered, a FakedObject is cre-
ated and returned as the pointer of the property. During
the execution of the program, the expected type of the
FakedObject is indicated by the involved operation. For
instance, adding a number object to a FakedObject
indicates that the FakedObject’s type is number. When
the type of a FakedObject can be determined, we update
it to the corresponding type.
Potentially, we could assign FakedObject with the
type Object and reuse the dynamic typing rules of the
JavaScript engine to coerce the FakedObject to an ex-
pected type. Nevertheless, the dynamic typing rules of the
JavaScript engine are designed to maintain the correctness
of JavaScript semantics and do not suffice to meet our
analysis goal of achieving maximized execution. This can be
attributed to two reasons. First, while the JavaScript engine
can cast the FakedObject:Object to proper primi-
tive values, it cannot cast the FakedObject:Object to
proper object types. For instance, when a FakedObject
with the type Object is used as a function object, the
JavaScript engine will raise the TypeError exception
according to ECMA specification [1]. Second, the casting of
FakedObject to primitive values by the JavaScript engine
can lead to unnecessary loss of precision. To understand
why, consider the following loop:
1 c = a / 2 ;
2 f o r ( i = c ; i <10000; i ++)
3 {
4 memory [ i ] = nop + nop + s h e l l c o d e ;
4
1 v a r a = n u l l ;
2 v a r b = c + 1 ;
3 v a r d = a . l e n g t h ;
4 v a r func = n u l l ;
5 a = ” H e l l o World ” ;
6 v a r e = new abc ( ) ;
7 i f ( b < 5) {
8 f unc = f u n c t i o n (
x ) {
9 r e t u r n x
10 } ;
11 }
12 d = func ( 6 ) ;
13 v a r f = Math . abs ( d ) ;
14 a r r a y [ 5 ] = f ;
Figure 4: JavaScript Sample
5 }
Since a is not defined, a FakedObject will be created.
With the built-in typing rule of the JavaScript engine, c will
be assigned the value NaN. The loop condition i < 10000
will always evaluate to false. Thus, the loop body, which
contains the heap spray code, will never be executed. Al-
though the path exploration of JSForce will guarantee
that the loop body will be executed once, without executing
the loop 10,000 times, it will likely be missed by heap
spray detection tools because of the small chunk of memory
allocated on the heap.
Therefore, to overcome the above two issues, JSForce
introduces two new types, FObj and FFun, to the
JavaScript type system. The JavaScript type system de-
fined in [40] is extended to support these two new types.
Figure 3 summarizes the new syntax of these JavaScript
types. Type FObj is for FakedObject. At the mo-
ment FakedObject is created, we assign type FObj
as the temporary type of FakedObject. It can be
subtyped to any types within the JavaScript type sys-
tem. When FakedObject is used as a function object,
FakedObject is casted to FakedFunction with type
FFun. The FakedFunction with type FFun can take
arbitrary input and always returns FakedObject:FObj.
Following JSForce’s dynamic typing rules, a in the above
loop sample will be typed to Number because it is used
as a dividend. c is then assigned to Number and the
loop body is executed repeatedly until the loop condition
i<10000 is evaluated to false. By introducing these two
new types and their typing rules, JSForce solves the two
issues mentioned in the above paragraph. In the following
paragraphs, we detail the JavaScript forced execution model.
Reference Error Recovery: To avoid raising
ReferenceError exceptions, we introduce the
FakedObject and recover the error by creating the
FakedObject whenever necessary. There are two cases
that lead to reference errors. The first case (ER 1) is a
failed object lookup. Every field access or prototype access
triggers a dynamic lookup using the field or prototype’s
name as the key. If no object is found, the lookup fails.
Such failures happen when the running environment is
incomplete or some portion of the JavaScript code is
missing. For example, a browser plugin referenced by
the JavaScript is not installed, or only a portion of the
JavaScript code is captured during the attack.
To handle this error, JSForce intercepts the lookup
process and a FakedObject named as the lookup key
is created whenever a failed lookup is captured. The cor-
responding parent object’s property is also updated to the
FakedObject. Line 2 in Figure 4 presents such an
example. The JavaScript engine searches the current code
scope for the definition of c, which is not defined. JSForce
returns the FakedObject as the temporary value of c so
that the execution can continue.
The second case (ER 2) occurs when the object is
initialized to the value null or undefined, but later has
its properties accessed. JSForce modifies the initialization
process to replace the null to a FakedObject if an
object is initialized as value null or undefined. For
example, the variable a defined on line 1 in Figure 4 is
assigned the value FakedObject instead of null under
the forced execution engine. The variable a may later be
updated to another value during execution, but this does not
sabotage the execution of JavaScript code.
Faked Object Retyping: When a FakedObject is
used within an expression, it must be retyped to the expected
type. Otherwise, incorrect typing raises a TypeError
exception and stops the execution. JSForce infers the ex-
pected type of FakedObject by how the FakedObject
is used. Figure 5 summarizes the dynamic typing rules
introduced by JSForce. The rules are divided into the
following five categories:
1) R-ASSIGN. This rule deals with assignment statements.
When a FakedObject e0 is assigned to a new value
e1, e0 is updated to the new value e1 with the type
τ . The JavaScript engine handles this naturally, so
no interference is required. For example, variable a
in Figure 4 is assigned FakedObject at line 1 by
JSForce. At line 4, the variable a is retyped as a
string object.
2) R-CALL1 and R-NEW. These two rules describe
the typing rule for the scenario when a
FakedObject:FObj is used as a function call
or by the new expression. Function calls and the
new expression both expect their first operand to
evaluate to a function. So, JSForce updates the
FakedObject:FObj to FakedFunction:FFun
for this situation. The FakedFunction is a special
function object which is configured to accept arbitrary
parameters. The return value of the function is set to
a FakedObject:FObj so that it can be retyped
whenever necessary.
3) R-CALL2. This rule describes the case where the callee
is a known function, but a FakedObject:FObj is
passed as a function parameter. JSForce types the
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R-ASSIGN
Γ ⊢lhs e0 ∶ ϕfo Γ ⊢ e1 ∶ τ
Γ ⊢ref e0 = e1 ∶ τ
R-CALL1
τ0 ⊵ Obj(Function(this ∶ τ ′; ⌈0⌉ ∶ τ1, ..., ⌈n–1⌉ ∶ τn, %→ τ))(%′)
Γ ⊢ref e0 ∶ ϕfo/τ⊢upd e0 ∶ ϕfo, %′@τ ↤ ϕff ,Γ ⊢ref e0(e1, ...., en) ∶ ϕfo/ ⊥
R-CALL2
τ0 ⊵ Obj(Function(this ∶ τ ′; ⌈0⌉ ∶ τ1, ..., ⌈n–1⌉ ∶ τn, %→ τ))(%′)
Γ ⊢ref e0 ∶ τ0/τ ′ Γ ⊢ e1 ∶ τ1 ...Γ ⊢ e(i–1) ∶ τ(i–1) Γ ⊢ ei ∶ ϕfo Γ ⊢ e(i+1) ∶ τ(i+1) ... Γ ⊢ en ∶ τn⊢upd ei ∶ ϕfo@τ ↤ τi,Γ ⊢ref e0(e1, ...., en) ∶ τ/ ⊥
R-NEW
τ0 ⊵ Obj(Function(this ∶ τ ′; ⌈0⌉ ∶ τ1, ..., ⌈n–1⌉ ∶ τn, %→ τ))(%′)
Γ ⊢ref e0 ∶ ϕfo/τ⊢upd e0 ∶ ϕfo, %′@τ ↤ ϕff ,Γ ⊢ref new e0(e1, ...., en) ∶ ϕfo/ ⊥
R-BINOPERATOR1
Γ ⊢ e1 ∶ ϕfo Γ ⊢ e2 ∶ τ ′ ¬(e2 is ϕfo)⊢upd e1 ∶ ϕfo@τ ↤ τ ′,Γ ⊢ e1 op e2 ∶ τ ′
R-BINOPERATOR2
Γ ⊢ e1 ∶ ϕfo Γ ⊢ e2 ∶ ϕfo⊢upd e1 ∶ ϕfo@τ ↤ ϕn,⊢upd e2 ∶ ϕfo@τ ↤ ϕn,Γ ⊢ e1 op e2 ∶ τ
R-INDEX1
Γ ⊢ e1 ∶ ϕfo τ1 ⊵ Obj(ϕ1)(%1) Γ ⊢ e2 ∶ ϕn⊢upd e1 ∶ ϕfo@τ ↤ τ1,Γ ⊢lhs e1[e2] ∶ ϕfo
R UNARYOPERATOR
Γ ⊢ e1 ∶ ϕfo⊢upd e2 ∶ ϕfo@τ ↤ ϕn,Γ ⊢ op e1 ∶ τ
R-INDEX2
Γ ⊢ e1 ∶ τ1 τ1 ⊵ Obj(ϕ1)(%1) Γ ⊢ e2 ∶ ϕfo ⊢upd %1@ϕn ↦ τ ′⊢upd e2 ∶ ϕfo@τ ↤ ϕn,Γ ⊢lhs e1[e2] ∶ τ ′
Figure 5: Typing rules
FakedObject:FObj to the required type of the
callee’s arguments. The JavaScript language has many
standard built-in libraries such as Math and Date.
When a FakedObject:FObj is used by the standard
library function, we update the type based upon the
specification of the library function [1]. Currently,
JSForce implements retyping for several common
libraries (e.g., Math, Number, Date).
4) R-BINOPERATOR1/2 and R-UNARYOPERATOR.
These three rules describe how to update the type
if the FakedObject:FObj is involved in an
expression with an operator. JSForce updates
the FakedObject:FObj’s type based upon the
semantics of the operator. For unary operators, it
is straightforward to determine the type from the
operator’s semantics. For instance, the postfix operator
indicates the type as number. For binary operators,
the typing becomes more complicated. If both operands
are FakedObject:FObj and the operator does not
reveal the type of the operands, JSForce types them
to number. This is because the number type can be
converted to most types naturally by the JavaScript
engine. For example, the number type in JavaScript
can be converted to the string type, but it may
fail to convert a string to a number. Later during
execution, if the types can be determined, JSForce
will update the type to the correct type. If only one of
the two operands is FakedObject:FObj, JSForce
determines the type based upon the other operand’s
type and the operator’s semantics.
5) R-INDEX1 and R-INDEX2. These two rules describe
how to update the type when there are indexing op-
erations. A FakedObject:FObj is updated to an
ArrayObject ∶ φo whenever a key is used as an
array index to access elements of the FakedObject.
JSForce creates an ArrayObject and initializes the
elements to FakedObject:FObj. The length of
the ArrayObject is set to 2*CurrentIndex. If an
Out-Of-Boundary access is found, JSForce doubles
the length of ArrayObject. If the array index is
FakedObject, JSForce types it to number and
initializes it as 0, which avoids Out-Of-Boundary ex-
ceptions. If both the index object and base object are
FakedObject:FObj, the R-INDEX2 rule is first
applied to update the index object to number, then the
R-INDEX1 rule is applied to update the base object to
ArrayObject.
Example: Table I presents a forced execution of the
sample shown in Figure 4. In the execution, the branch
in lines 8-11 is not taken. At line 1, JSForce as-
signs a FakedObject:Fobj to a, instead of null.
This is because at line 3 the access to property length
raises an exception if a is null. On line 2, we
can see a FakedObject:FObj is first assigned to
c. Once c is added to 1, JSForce updates the
value of c to a random number. Lines 6 and 7 show
that if a FakedObject:FObj is used in the func-
tion call or new expression, JSForce updates it to
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Statement Action Rule
1: var a = null; a↤ FakedObject ER 2
2: var b = c + 1; c↤ FakedObject ER 1
c↤ RanNumber R BINOPERATOR1
3: var d = a.length; a.length↤ FakedObject ER 1
4: var func = null; func↤ FakedObject ER 2
5: a = ”Hello World”; a↤ ”HelloWorld” R ASSIGN
6: var e = new abc(); abc↤ FakedObject ER 1
abc↤ fakedFunction R NEW
7: if(b <5) NO ACTION NONE
12: d = func(6) func↤ fakedFunction R CALL1
d↤ FakedObject R ASSIGN
13: var f = Math.abs(d) d↤ RanNumber R CALL2
14: array[5] = f;
array ↤ FakedObject ER 1
array ↤ arrayObject R INDEX1
array[5]↤ f R ASSIGN
Table I: Forced execution of sample in Figure 4
FakedFunction:FFun. The return value of the faked
function is still configured to FakedObject:FObj, so
that at line 13, d is updated to hold a random number.
JSForce also automatically recovers from other ex-
ceptions by intercepting those exceptions to eliminate the
exception condition. For example, JSForce will update a
divisor to a non-zero value if a division-by-zero exception
is raised.
B. Path Exploration in JSForce
One important functionality of JSForce is the capability
of exploring different execution paths of a given JavaScript
snippet to expose its behavior and acquire complete analysis
results. In this subsection, we explain the path exploration
algorithm and strategies.
In practice, attackers constantly adopt the dynamic fea-
tures of JavaScript to aid in evading detection. This results
in incomplete path exploration under two circumstances. The
first is when strings are dynamically generated. For instance,
document.write is often abused to inject dynamically
decoded malicious JavaScript code into the page at runtime.
The second is when event callbacks are used. As discussed
in Section II, attackers can abuse event callbacks to stop
the execution of malicious code. JSForce solves this by
employing specific path exploration strategies. Within the
execution, if faked functions take strings as input, JSForce
examines the strings and executes the code if they contain
JavaScript. This strategy is only applied on faked functions
since original functions (eval) can handle the strings as
defined. JSForce also detects the callback registration
function and invokes the callback function immediately after
the current execution terminates.
JSForce treats try-catch statements as if-else
statements, ie., it executes each try block and catch block
separately. Ternary operators are also treated as if-else
statements: both values are evaluated.
There are several different path exploration algorithms:
linear search, quadratic search, and exponential search [33].
Algorithm 1 Path Exploration Algorithm
Definitions: switches - the set of switched predicates in a forced
execution, denoted by a sequence of predicate offsets in the source
file(SrcName:offset). For example, t.js ∶ 15 ⋅ t.js ∶ 83 ⋅ t.js ∶ 100
means the branch in source file t.js with the offset 15, 83, 100 is
switched. EX , WL - a set of forced executions, each denoted by
a sequence of switched predicates. preds ∶ Predicate × boolean
- the sequence of executed predicates.
Input: The tested JS
Output: FULL EX
1: FULL EX ← ∅
2: SRC ← {JS}
3: while SRC do
4: WL← {∅}
5: EX ← ∅
6: js← SRC.pop()
7: while WL do
8: switches←WL.pop()
9: EX ← EX ∪ switches
10: (preds, newJS)← EXECUTECODE(js, switches)
11: SRC ← SRC ∪ newJS
12: t← len(switches)
13: preds← remove the first t elements in preds
14: for all (p, b) ∈ preds do
15: if !covered(p,¬b) then
16: WL←WL ∪ switches ⋅ (p, b)
17: end if
18: end for
19: end while
20: FULL EX ← FULL EX ∪ {EX ∶ js}
21: end while
22: procedure EXECUTECODE(JS, switches)
23: preds← switches
24: CBQ← ∅
25: newJS ← ∅
26: for all stmt ∈ JS do
27: if isNoneEvalFunctionCallStmt(stmt) then
28: if CalleeTakesStrings(stmt) then
29: newJS ← newJS ∪
GetJSFromString(stmt)
30: end if
31: if CalleeRegisterCallback(stmt) then
32: CBQ← CBQ ∪ExtractCBFunc(stmt)
33: end if
34: else if isBranchStmt(stmt) then
35: if GetSwitch(stmt) ∈ switches then
36: Execute according to switches
37: else
38: preds← preds ⋅GetPredicate(stmt)
39: end if
40: end if
41: end for
42: for all cb ∈ CBQ do
43: (preds′, newJS′)← EXECUTECODE(cb,∅)
44: newJS ← newJS ∪ newJS′
45: preds← preds ⋅ preds′
46: end for
return (preds, newJS)
47: end procedure
The goal of path exploration in JSForce is to maximize
the code coverage to improve the detection rate of mali-
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cious payload with an acceptable performance overhead.
Quadratic and exponential searches are too expensive, so
JSForce employs the linear search only.
Algorithm 1 describes the path exploration algorithm,
which generates a pool of forced executions that achieve
maximized code coverage. The complexity is O(n), where
n is the number of JavaScript statements. n may change
at runtime because JavaScript code can be dynamically
generated. Initially, JSForce executes the program without
switching any predicates since switches is initialized as∅ (line 8) for the first time. JSForce executes the program
according to the switches at line 10 and returns preds
and dynamically generated code newJS. In lines 12-17, we
determine if it would be of interest to further switch more
predicate instances. Lines 11-13 compute the sequence of
predicate instances eligible for switching. Note that it cannot
be a predicate before the last switched predicate specified
in switches. Switching such a predicate may change
the control flow such that the specification in switches
becomes invalid. Specifically, line 16 switches the predicate
if the other branch has not been covered. In each new forced
execution, we essentially switch one more predicate.
The procedure ExecuteCode (lines 22-47) describes
the execution process. It collects dynamically generated
JavaScript code (lines 28-30) and the executed predicates
(lines 34-38). The new generated JavaScript code, newJS,
will be executed after the path exploration of the current js
finishes. The registered callback functions (lines 31-33) are
also queued and invoked after the current execution finishes
(lines 42-46). As an example, recall the callback function
redir() used in line 16 of Figure 1. Instead of waiting for
the timeout, JSForce will trigger the redir() function
immediately after the current execution finishes.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
JSForce is implemented by extending the V8 JavaScript
engine [11] on the X86-64 platform. It is comprised of
approximately 4,600 lines of C/C++ code and 1,500 lines
of Python code. We address some prominent challenges of
its implementation in this section.
Reference Error Recovery & Faked Object Retyping:
In V8, an abstract syntax tree (AST) is generated for every
function, which is then compiled into native code (known
as Just-In-Time code). V8 adopts an inline caching tech-
nique [23] to accelerate property accesses. If the property
access fails, the execution jumps to the V8 runtime system
which handles any inline cache misses. If the runtime
system is unable to handle an inline cache miss, either
due to reference error or type check error, it raises the
corresponding exception and stops the execution.
We modify the inline cache miss handling process to
enable reference error recovery and faked object retyp-
ing. For reference error recovery, JSForce creates and
returns the FakedObject for failed object lookup by
changing the V8 property access failure handling functions
like Runtime LoadIC Miss. For faked object retyping,
JSForce inserts additional code into runtime methods like
Runtime BinaryOpIC Miss that is executed prior to
the exception being raised. This additional code follows the
rules described in Section III-A to conduct the retyping
process if the involved operation contains a FakedObject.
Predicates Flip: We have two approaches available to
flip the predicates. The first approach is to flip the predicates
within the Just-in-Time code. The Just-in-Time code can
be optimized (inline caching, etc.) by V8 in accordance
with the execution profile. To enable predicates flipping,
a runtime function must be inserted before every branch
so that JSForce can manipulate the predicate value. This
approach may affect the optimization process of Just-in-
Time code.
JSForce takes the second approach: if the branch A
of a predicate needs to be taken, JSForce replaces the
other branch with this branch A. At runtime, no mat-
ter which branch is taken, the branch A is executed.
For instance, we want to take the {A} branch of the
statement if(e){A}else{B}. JSForce changes it to
if(e){A}else{A}, so that {A} is executed at runtime.
Loops and Recursions: Sometimes, JSForce may
cause a loop to execute for a very long time, due to the intro-
duction of faked objects. To solve this problem, JSForce
inserts a time counter for every loop statement (for...in
and for...of are excluded, as they will always terminate),
and it will terminate the loop if the execution time exceeds a
limit. Similarly, if JSForce forces a predicate that guards
the termination of a recursive function call, a very deep
recursion may result. To address deep recursion, JSForce
monitors the stack depth. Once the maximum call stack size
(defined by V8) is reached, calls to that function are omitted
by JSForce.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we present details on the evaluation
of correctness, effectiveness and runtime performance of
JSForce using a large number of real-world samples.
A. Dataset & Experiment Setup
Dataset: The complete dataset used for our evaluation
consists of two sample sets: a malicious sample set and a
benign sample set. For the malicious set, we collected a sam-
ple set with 172,995 HTML files and 23,509 PDF files from
various databases including VirusTotal [12], Contagio [2],
MalTrafficAnalysis [3], and Threatglass [4]. Among those,
all samples from VirusTotal were new samples evaluated
within a month of being submitted, with the samples pro-
vided from other sources being relatively old. For the benign
sample set, we crawled the Alexa top 100 websites [5] and
collected 47,592 HTML files.
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Category Total Detected by JSForce Percentage
True Positive 389 389 100%
False Positive 47,592 9 0.019%
Table II: Correctness Results.
Experiment Setup: For JavaScript code analysis, we
leverage the jsunpack [22] tool. Jsunpack is a widely used
malicious JavaScript code analysis tool that utilizes the
SpiderMonkey [6] JavaScript engine for code execution.
Six distinct configurations are predefined within jsunpack
to maximize the exploration of JavaScript code by trying
different browsers and language settings. For the sake of our
evaluation, we replaced the SpiderMonkey from jsunpack
with JSForce and relied upon the detection policies in
jsunpack for malicious code detection. Most of our experi-
ments are based upon the comparison between the original
jsunpack and the JSForce-extended jsunpack. Note that
the experiments performed within this paper are only in-
tended to show the improvement of detection results over the
original ones when adopting JSForce. The detection policy
itself is another important research topic which is orthogonal
to the focus of this paper. We conducted our experiments
on a test machine equipped with Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5-2650
CPU (20M Cache, 2GHz) and 128GB of physical memory.
The operating system was Ubuntu 12.04.3 (64bit).
B. Correctness
In this section, we evaluate the correctness of the analysis
result for JSForce. The goals of this evaluation are two-
fold. First, we wish to know the true positive rate of our
analysis results, meaning that we wish to verify whether a
JavaScript program is undoubtedly malicious if it is tagged
as one by the analysis tools. Second, we wish to understand
any false positives in the results so as to determine whether
any benign JavaScript code can be mistakenly labeled as
malicious.
True positive: With our first goal in mind, we queried
VirusTotal [12] for malicious HTML files and collected
389 samples which are precisely labeled with specific
CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) numbers that
match CVEs listed in jsunpack. Furthermore, we manually
reviewed each of the samples and confirmed the existence of
shellcode or malicious signatures. This step is to guarantee
all the samples we tested are real malicious samples that
should be detected by our tool. Then, we analyzed the
samples using jsunpack with JSForce. The experimental
result is listed in the first row of Table II as “true positive”.
It shows that JSForce could successfully detect all of the
samples, resulting in a 100% true positive rate. To better
understand these results, we further inspected the detailed
analysis results to see why our tool tagged samples as
malicious. Our inspection results revealed that all of the
payload and malicious signatures extracted by the JSForce
are indeed malicious, proving that our tool can achieve very
high true positive rate with accurate analysis details.
False positive: For our second goal, we analyzed
our benign sample set using JSForce and then observed
whether any of the samples could be incorrectly labeled as
malicious. As shown in the second row of Table II, the
JSForce tags 9 out of 47,592 samples as malicious. We
first manually confirmed that all 9 samples are clean and
thereupon study why the false positives happen. It has been
verified by manual inspection that all of the false positives
are caused by the inaccurate detection policy, to be more
specific, the over-relaxation of the shellcode string matching
policy enforced by jsunpack. The reason why our tool could
detect them as malicious is that it explores JavaScript code
in a more complete fashion in consequence of our forced
execution technique. Therefore, based upon the above ex-
perimental results, we argue that using JSForce will keep
a very low false positive rate for JavaScript code analysis,
and is able to assist in accomplishing more thorough results.
Theoretically, JSForce can generate higher code coverage
than jsunpack and lead to better analysis results. But, the
question is by how much. With that, we conducted another
set of experiments to show the effectiveness of JSForce.
C. Effectiveness
For the evaluation of effectiveness, we would like to
demonstrate that JSForce can indeed help the malicious
JavaScript code analysis by performing efficient forced ex-
ecution. In order to achieve that, we utilize our malicious
HTML and PDF sample sets and run the sample sets against
jsunpack both with or without JSForce for the evaluation.
In the interest of showing how useful our faked object
retyping is, we also conduct another experiment that disables
the retyping and only keeps the reference error recovery
component and path exploration component.
Experimental Results: Table III illustrates the ex-
perimental results for effectiveness. It demonstrates that
JSForce could greatly improve the detection rate for
JavaScript analysis. We can see detection rate improvements
of 759.84% and 4.84% for HTML and PDF samples, re-
spectively, when using JSForce-extended jsunpack instead
of the original version for analysis. And all the samples
detected by original jsunpack are also flagged by JSForce-
extended jsunpack. We further break down the numbers into
old and new sample sets and perceive that the extended
version could perform much better than original jsunpack in
analyzing new samples. For new HTML samples, jsunpack
with JSForce is able to detect 817.3% more samples while
for old samples, the number is 84.97%. Similar results are
also observed for PDF samples. After manual inspection,
we confirmed that this is because many of the old samples
have been analyzed for quite sometime and jsunpack already
has the signatures stored in its database, leaving only a
small margin for JSForce to improve upon. For the faked
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Sample Set Total without
JSForce
with
JSForce
Improvement DetectedBy Both
Missed
With JSForce
Old HTML 66,325 193 357 84.9% 193 0
New HTML 106,018 2,250 20,649 817.3% 2250 0
HTML Total 172,995 2,443 21,006 759.8% 2443 0
Old PDF 22,081 6,306 6,475 2.7% 6306 0
New PDF 1,428 32 170 431.2% 32 0
PDF Total 23,509 6,338 6,645 4.8% 6338 0
Table III: Effectiveness Results.
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Figure 6: Num of Path Exploration during Analysis.
object retyping evaluation, we reran the test using 106,018
new HTML malicious samples with retyping component
disabled. The result shows that only 8,677 samples can be
detected by JSForce in contrast to 20,649 with retyping
enabled. This result reveals the usefulness of our faked
object retyping component during analysis. Nevertheless,
through our experiments, we are able to draw the conclusion
that JSForce is quite effective for boosting the effective-
ness of JavaScript analysis.
Number of Paths Explored: Potentially, there may be a
large number of paths that exist inside of a single JavaScript
program. The effectiveness and efficiency of JSForce are
closely related to the number of paths explored during
analysis. Hence, we would like to show some statistics on
the number of paths that JSForce explored during analysis.
The result depicted in Figure 6 shows that JSForce is
able to detect the maliciousness of samples with a limited
number of path explorations. An interesting observation is
that over 96% of the samples were detected by exploring
only a single path. Even though most of the analysis for
detected samples can be finished by exploring just one path,
the path exploration of JSForce is still essential. Note that
98% of the samples missed by the default jsunpack, but
detected by the JSForce-extended version, explore at least
two paths. So, the analysis could still receive an enormous
benefit from JSForce in terms of path exploration. Please
refer to the Section 6 Case Study for more details on this
topic. As for any undetected samples, JSForce will explore
the entire code space during analysis, which requires a larger
amount of path exploration and longer analysis runtime.
D. Runtime Performance
In this section, we evaluate the runtime performance
of JSForce by using our malicious and benign datasets
with a comparison between the original jsunpack and the
JSForce-extended version.
Runtime for Detected Samples: In this section, we
compare the runtime performance using the HTML and PDF
samples that can be detected by jsunpack both with and
without JSForce. The reason why we chose this sample
set is that we wished to observe whether the JSForce-
extended version can achieve efficiency comparable to the
original jsunpack when using a detectable malicious sample.
The results are displayed in Figures 7 and 9. The results
conclude that JSForce-extended version has better runtime
performance than jsunpack for over 90.9% of HTML and
83.6% of PDF samples. This conclusion is quite surprising
as the JSForce-extended version tends to explore multiple
paths while jsunpack only probes for one.
In theory, jsunpack should have better runtime perfor-
mance. However, after investigation, we found that many of
the JavaScript samples require specific system configurations
(such as specific browser kernel version) to run. As a result,
when jsunpack performs analysis, it will run the JavaScript
programs under multiple settings. This results in multiple
executions, which take additional time to complete. In con-
trast, the JSForce-extended version handled this issue with
forced execution, resulting in better runtime performance in
practice.
Runtime for Undetected Samples: Figures 8 and 10
show the runtime performance of JSForce for undetected
samples. We empirically set the time limit to be 300 seconds
in consequence of the fact that experiment shows almost all
(99.6%) HTML and PDF samples can be analyzed within
300 seconds. As demonstrated in the figures, the average
analysis runtime for HTML and PDF samples are 12.02
and 8.15 seconds, while the analysis for a majority (80%)
of HTML samples and PDF samples are finished within
8.54 and 7.4 seconds, respectively. When compared with the
original jsunpack, the JSForce-extended version achieves
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an average runtime of 16.08 seconds and 7.97 seconds for
undetected HTML and PDF samples while jsunpack finishes
execution in 1.13 seconds and 1.37 seconds, correspond-
ingly. Our conclusion from these experiments are that the
performance overhead of JSForce is quite reasonable and
can certainly meet the requirements of large scale JavaScript
analysis.
E. JSForce vs. Rozzle
Ideally, we would like to perform a head-to-head com-
parison between JSForce and Rozzle using the same
dataset. Unfortunately, it is impossible given that neither the
Rozzle system nor the dataset used by Rozzle is available
for evaluation. It is also nontrivial to implement Rozzle
by ourselves. Nevertheless, we can still highlight several
advantages of JSForce over Rozzle, from the experimental
results reported in that paper.
First, while Rozzle-extended analysis system does,
JSForce-extended analysis system does not miss samples
detected by the original analysis system. Table IV summa-
rizes the detection results presented in Rozzle paper. Using
Rozzle, the experiments extend two malicious JavaScript
detection systems - Nozzle [35] and Zozzle [18], and
then compare the detection results with the original system
using one offline sample set and one online sample set.
For the offline experiment, with Rozzle, Nozzle can detect
11,559 samples and gains a significant improvement(11,559
vs. 1,662) over original Nozzle. But it misses 484 (29%)
samples which can be detected by original Nozzle. For on-
line experiments, Rozzle-extended configuration also misses
24 (32%) for Nozzle, 225 (8%) for Zozzle respectively.
Rozzle paper argues this is because that the runtime errors,
introduced when infeasible paths are executed, terminates
the execution before the malicious behaviors are exposed.
However, since JSForce only collects the path information
and no changes are made on the path when the sample is first
executed, no runtime errors are introduced by JSForce.
Thus as demonstrated in Section V-C, JSForce-extended
analysis system can detect all the samples identified by
original analysis system while providing the same magnitude
improvement as Rozzle’s.
Second, JSForce can still function even when the en-
vironment setup is incomplete, thanks to the forced ex-
ecution model (Section III-A), whereas Rozzle may fail
due to the runtime errors. This is especially important
for low-interaction honey clients like jsunpack. Those low-
interaction honey clients emulate the behaviors of browsers
or PDF readers, and it is quite challenging to construct
a complete environment setup for the tested samples. As
discussed in Section VI, of the malicious samples missed by
jsunpack, 96.5% are because of the runtime errors caused
by incomplete emulation of the running environments for
JavaScript code. Since low-interaction honey clients are
widely deployed in industry, we argue that JSForce would
benefit the industry more than Rozzle.
Third, as discussed in the limitation part of Rozzle paper,
Rozzle is less effective for the case that the evasive code
triggers the malware execution only when a user interaction
occurs, or when a timer fires. We searched the samples
missed by jsunpack with the keywords like “onclick” or
“settimeout”. we found that 80.6% of them deploy timers
or user interaction callbacks. JSForce’s path exploration
algorithm discovers the callback functions during the exe-
cution, and invokes them after the current run terminates.
However, Rozzle may miss the malicious code hidden in
callback functions.
Fourth, Rozzle cannot handle latest fingerprinting tech-
niques discussed in Section II. While we have not found
samples deploying these techniques in our dataset, we be-
lieve that the attacker will deploy those new fingerprinting
techniques with the advancement of anti-evasion techniques
in the future. So JSForce is one step ahead of the attacker.
VI. CASE STUDY
t r y {++( document [ ” body ” ] ) ;
} c a t c h ( e ) {[ s h e l l c o d e ]}
[a]
window . addEvent ( ’ l o a d ’ ,
f u n c t i o n ( ) {[ s h e l l c o d e
]} )
[b]
f u n c t i o n frmAdd ( ) {
v a r i f r m = document . c r e a t e E l e m e n t ( ’ i f r a m e ’ ) ;
i f r m . s t y l e . p o s i t i o n = ’ a b s o l u t e ’ ;
document . body . appendCh i ld ( i f r m ) ;} ;
frmAdd ( ) ;
[c]
v a r se show newupdates = new Hash . Cookie ( ’
se show newupdates ’ , { d u r a t i o n : 3600}) ;
[d]
g a p i . l o a d ( ” g a p i . i f r a m e s ” , f u n c t i o n ( ) { [ . . . ] } ) ;
[e]
Figure 11: Case Study Samples
To better understand the benefits of JSForce, we con-
ducted a case study on 10,975 unique JavaScript code
samples missed by jsunpack but detected by JSForce-
extended version. The reasons of failed detection using
jsunpack can be divided into the following two categories.
Malicious code branch is not triggered: Of those
10,975 samples missed by jsunpack, we found that 10,792
(98.33%) samples are explored by at least two paths when
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Figure 7: Runtime for Detected HTML samples.
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Figure 8: Runtime for Undetected HTML samples.
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Figure 9: Runtime for Detected PDF samples.
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Figure 10: Runtime for Undetected PDF samples.
AnalysisSystem SampleSet Conf. w/o Rozzle Conf. With Rozzle DetectedByBothConf MissedByRozzle-extendedConf.
Nozzle Offline 1,662 11,559 1,178 484(29%)Online 74 224 50 24(32%)
Zozzle Online 2,735 2,660 2,510 225(8%)
Table IV: Detection Results With/Without Rozzle-extended Configuration
using JSForce. Although jsunpack attempts to run the
sample several times with different configurations to increase
the chance of triggering the malicious code branch, it is
usually ineffective to do so. This is because it is impossible
to emulate every single combination of browser/PDFRead-
er/plugin. In contrast, JSForce can explore these paths
regardless of the configuration.
The sample in Figure 11(a) hides malicious code within
a catch block. The attacker attempts to increase the value
document[body] as a number, which will raise an excep-
tion when executed within a real browser. However, it does
not raise an exception in jsunpack since its SpiderMonkey
engine returns NaN for this operation. In fact, the V8
engine used in JSForce also exhibits the same behavior
as SpiderMonkey. But, the catch block is triggered by the
path exploration process, so the malicious behavior is still
revealed.
Other samples hide code within event callbacks. For
instance, the sample in Figure 11(b) registers a callback
function using the window.addEvent function. jsunpack
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fails to invoke the callback function due to the incorrect
definition of window.addEvent used by jsunpack. At
runtime, JSForce identifies window.addEvent as a
callback registration function because an anonymous func-
tion is passed to it as the parameter. Then, this anonymous
function is queued and invoked at the end of execution.
Execution fails due to runtime errors: Another reason
why jsunpack may fail to detect malicious JavaScript code
is that the execution can fail due to runtime errors. As we
conducted the evaluation, only 230 out of the 10,975 samples
could be executed without any runtime errors under the
six configurations. Moreover, 10,592 out of 10,975 (96.5%)
failed all six configurations, rendering jsunpack completely
useless when facing them. These exceptions terminate the
execution before the malicious code is executed. The raised
exceptions are because of the inaccurate emulation of the
running environment for JavaScript code. Examining these
exceptions can help security researchers improve jsunpack
by supplying more precise emulation environment, which is
another benefit that JSForce can provide.
One interesting thing about jsunpack is that it tries
to fix ReferrenceError by providing a definition for
this undefined object once ReferrenceError is captured.
While this fix eliminates the ReferrenceError, it of-
ten introduces SyntaxError or TypeError at runtime.
ifrm.style is not defined in the sample in Figure 11(c).
So jsunpack generates code var ifrm.style = 1 for
this sample. Unfortunately, it contains an unexpected token
dot. This raises a SyntaxError exception. Another way
to improve this is to assign ifrm.style an Object so
that SyntaxError is avoided and ifrm.style can be
typed following the typing rules of the JavaScript engine.
However, as discussed in Section III-A, this can still cause
an exception or lead to unnecessary loss of precision. This
case demonstrates the advantage of type inference model
deployed by JSForce. Although JSForce cannot tolerate
SyntaxError, the type inference model guarantees no
further TypeError or SyntaxError will be introduced.
The sample in Figure 11(d) raises a TypeError exception
since Hash.Cookie is not a constructor. Another sample
in Figure 11(e) also raises a TypeError exception because
gapi.load is not a function. JSForce can avoid this by
applying faked object retyping technique. From another per-
spective, these two cases manifest the weakness of jsunpack
that Hash.Cookie and gapi.load are not correctly
defined. Therefore, as another application, JSForce can
be used to evaluate the weakness of dynamic JavaScript
analysis systems, so security researchers can further improve
the systems respectively.
VII. LIMITATIONS
If the syntax of the tested JavaScript code is not cor-
rect, JSForce drops the analysis immediately. The forced
execution can introduce syntax error under some cases.
1 v a r f = f u n c t i o n ( ) {
2 i f ( t r u e ) {
3 f u n c t i o n g ( )
{ r e t u r n 1 ;}
4 } e l s e {
5 f u n c t i o n g ( )
{ r e t u r n 2 ;}
6 } ;
7 f u n c t i o n g ( ) {
r e t u r n 3 ; } ;
8 r e t u r n g ( ) ;
9 f u n c t i o n g ( ) {
r e t u r n 4 ;}
10 }
Figure 12: A JavaScript Sample Interpreted Differently by
Different JavaScript Engines
For instance, the parameter of eval is supposed to be
correct JavaScript code. When the parameter is calculated
from faked strings created by JSForce, the parameter may
become syntax incorrect for eval. In the future, we expect
to develop techniques [14] to automatically fix the syntax
error to enable maximized execution of the code.
While JavaScript language has the official specification
from the ECMAScript community [1], the implementation of
the language on different JavaScript engines differs slightly
because of the complex features and rapid evolving of
JavaScript language. The attacker can exploit this weakness
to create a deliberate script which exhibits differently on
JSForce to evade the analysis. Maffeis et al. [30] discussed
such an example presented in Figure 12. This code defines
a function f whose behavior is given by one of the decla-
rations of g inside the body of the anonymous function that
returns g. However, different implementations disagree on
which declaration determines the behavior of f. Specifically,
a call to f() should return 4, according to ECMA specifica-
tion. SpiderMonkey returns 4, while Rhino and Safari return
1, and JScript and the ECMA4 reference implementations
return 2. Attackers can leverage these differences to hide
the decoding key and evade analysis. To counter this, we can
implement JSForce on top of different JavaScript engines,
such as SpiderMonkey [6] and Chakra [7].
The current path exploration algorithm can efficiently
explore most of the sample in a decent time. However, there
are still some cases that take a considerable length of time
to finish. To exploit this limitation, attackers may place the
malicious code deep in the code logic, such that JSForce
could not reach it within a predefined duration. Note that
this limitation is not unique for JSForce. All the path
exploration techniques share the same limitation. We leave it
as future work to develop better path exploration algorithms
and search heuristics.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Malicious JavaScript Analysis: In the last few years,
there have been a number of approaches to analyzing
JavaScript code. They can be roughly divided into two
categories-static approach, dynamic approach.
Static Approach. Several systems have focused on stati-
cally analyzing JavaScript code to identify malicious web
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pages [20], [27], [38], [18]. ZOZZLE [18], in particular,
leverages features associated with AST context information
(such as, the presence of a variable named shellcode in
the context of a loop), for its classification. Since dynamic
features of JavaScript plague the static analysis , researchers
try to model those features to improve the static analysis
result [34], [39], [13].
Dynamic Approach. Dynamic analysis is widely deployed
to expose behaviors of obfuscated JavaScript code. Previous
work [17], [29], [22] execute JavaScript using an emulated
JavaScript running environment and acquire de-obfuscated
JavaScript code. To de-obfuscate malicious JavaScript code,
Gen et al. [29] simplify the obfuscated JavaScript code by
preserving the semantics of the observational equivalence.
JSGuard [21] proposed a methodology to detect JavaScript
shellcode that fully uses JavaScript code execution environ-
ment information with low false negative and false positive.
Liu et al. [28] propose a context-aware approach for
detection and confinement of malicious JavaScript in PDF
by inserting context monitoring code into a document. To
analyze JavaScript code with cloaking , Kolbitsch et al. [26]
uncover environment-specific malware by exploring multiple
execution paths within a single execution. JSForce can
benefit the dynamic analysis in terms of improved code
coverage and tolerance of invalid host environment model.
Researchers also try to combine static and dy-
namic code features to identify malicious JavaScript pro-
grams(Cujo [36]). More precisely, Cujo processes the static
program and traces of its execution into q-grams that
are classified using machine learning techniques. Symbolic
execution [37] is also explored for malicious JavaScript
analysis.
Forced Execution: Researchers have proposed to force
branch outcomes for different security applications. X-
Force [33] can force the binary to execute and explore
different execution paths requiring no inputs or proper
environment. iRis [19] employs forced execution technique
to expose the private API abuses in iOS applications. Forced
execution was also proposed to identify kernel-level rootk-
its] [45], expose hidden behavior in Android apps [24],
[44]. To the best of our knowledge, JSForce is the first
work to enable forced execution on JavaScript for malware
detection.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented the design and implementa-
tion of a novel JavaScript forced execution engine named
JSForce which enables non crashable execution model
while ensuring complete code coverage. We evaluated
JSForce using a large number of HTML and PDF samples.
Experimental results showed that by adopting our forced
execution engine, the malicious JavaScript detection rate can
be greatly improved without any noticeable false positive
increase and the runtime overhead was generally neglectable.
JSForce is made publicly available at [9] as an online
service and will release the source code to the security
community upon the acceptance for publication.
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